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What does Europe have to offer IR? 
Exogenisation and real-life data
Iver B. Neumann 
London School of Economics and Political Science, and Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs (NUPI)
Knowledge production takes many forms. The ones where I have decided to spend 
my life were institutionalised around the turn of the last century, under the name of 
social sciences. International relations arose in Europe as a particular constellation 
and mix of already extant knowledge traditions. As a result of the Nazi takeover in 
Germany and the Second World War, the hegemony of the discipline moved across 
the water to the United States, where it was almost subject to another social science 
with another history, namely Political Science. What Europe, and particularly Brit-
ain, where the discipline has maintained the strongest institutionalised autonomy, 
may offer IR today, is an escape from that hegemony. In this article, I will con-
centrate on two concrete ways in which this may be done, one conceptual and one 
methodological.
Conceptual offer: Studying the changing state
In a long list of anni horribili for IR under US hegemony, the outstanding one is 
arguably 1965. 1 In that year, David Easton published two functionalist books where 
he argued that political science should bracket the question of what a state was, and 
rather focus on what already existing institutions of government did in response to 
external demands.2 This was clearly a plea for policy relevance, for the underlying 
concern was how political scientists could help government officials perform bet-
ter. It was also a blatantly reductionist programme. First, the area of validity of the 
framework proposed by Easton turned out to be democratic systems. If the relation-
ship between state and society and the competition between parts of government 
follow other logics than the democratic one, Easton’s approach is of very limited 
value. I found this out to my cost when I started my career and tried to apply standard 
political science models to the study of the Soviet Union. It did not work. The second 
reason why Easton’s influence on political science was so damaging was his exog-
enising of the state. Easton reduced to a given assumption what should have been the 
1 This paragraph draws on my inaugural lecture at the LSE, 13 February 2013.
2  David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1965); David Easton, A 
Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).
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very focus of political inquiry, namely how there may be such a thing as a state, or 
a polity for that matter, in the first place. American and global political science was, 
seemingly indelibly, marked by Easton’s reductionism. In the case of the US, Easton 
basically moved social inquiry back to what it had looked like before the arrival of 
exiled European intellectuals in the 1930s for, as John Gunnell3 has demonstrated, 
American political discourse traditionally did not know the concept of the state. 
In Europe, the recoils from Easton’s salvoes served to play down the significance 
of state theory. As a result, the important questions of what makes states and rela-
tions between states possible in the first place were pushed into the background by 
intellectually less but bureaucratically more interesting questions about how specific 
institutions and humans relate to one another inside a political system  that is simply 
treated as a given. This is an historical loss for Political Science, which is supposed 
to have the state as its central object of study. Indeed, in German, as well as in the 
Scandinavian languages, the discipline is known as Staatswissenschaft/Statsveten-
skap/Statskundskab/Statsvitenskap – the study of (or knowledge about) the state. 
Easton’s move was an attack on the European roots not only of Political Science, but 
on the social sciences in general, for the state remains central to our understanding 
of large-scale social life, historically as well as contemporaneously.
With the rise of globalisation, the nature of the state is changing.4 If the study 
of the modi operandi of states is still central to our understanding of IR, if states are 
different in this regard, and if they are changing at that, then it stands to reason that 
any attempt at grasping changes in global politics must start by treating the state as a 
phenomenon to be studied, and not as a given entity. To put it in American English, 
the state cannot remain an independent variable, it must be exogenised and studied 
as a dependent variable. 
There are only three ways to go about this. We may study states historically, we 
may study them comparatively, and we may study imagined states. Let us bracket the 
latter possibility and focus on the two former. They were already the key approaches 
to the study of social life suggested by the likes of Durkheim and Weber. They were 
both historical thinkers, and matters historical dominate their work. They remain 
the acts to follow. Key early IR scholars were acutely aware of this, and behaved 
accordingly.  E. H. Carr was decisively influenced by German social science, mainly 
through the towering figure of the early sociologist of knowledge, Karl Mannheim.5 
Morgenthau was a Weberian.6 We cannot simply follow Henry Ford, and treat his-
tory as if it were mostly bunk. That would cut us off from studying most relations 
between polities, for these are to be found in the past.
Methodological offer: Real-life data
3  John Gunnell, Imagining the American Polity: American Political Science and the Discourse of Democracy 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004). 
4  Iver B. Neumann & Ole Jacob Sending, Governing the Global Polity (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan 
Press, 2010).
5  Susan Stedman Jones, ’What Does Durkheim Mean by ”Thing”?’ in Durkheim:Critical Assessments of Lead-
ing Sociologists, Vol. 1, pp. 300-312 (London: Routledge, 2001 edition) 
6  Michael C. Williams, ’Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and 
the Moral Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 58, Issue 4 (2004), pp. 633–65.
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If our object of study should be political and social life involving a plurality of poli-
ties, and if the state remains central in this regard, the next question would have to 
be how to study these relations. If the first major thing Europe has to offer IR is the 
study of the full gamut of cases, the second is a set of methodologies for studying 
extant relations. We should not begin by assuming this and assuming that. We should 
analyse the exchanges between the rulers and the ruled. These are mostly textual 
exchanges. We should mingle with policy makers – state-employed or otherwise – 
and find out what they are doing, what they think they are doing, and the difference 
between the two. As Weber7 put it, ‘The dilettante differs from the expert […] only 
in that he lacks a firm and reliable work procedure’. 
This is another regard in which American hegemony in IR has been destructive. 
These days, methodology has basically become a question of how to count. Count-
ing is fine. Correlations are interesting. They do not, however, help much in our 
understanding of what politics means to those involved. Quantitative methods are 
nice for the scholar who sees her calling in furnishing the powers that be with data 
that may be used to engineer social relations. They are not necessarily so nice if we 
want to understand the logic of social relations. That is a quantitative system. The 
problem is that scholars who work qualitatively have a tendency to duck questions of 
methodology. We do not take our forays into the social seriously enough to maintain 
a running conversation about how to do it.
For this reason, I believe that it is the blossoming of political anthropology that 
keeps the classical study of politics alive.8 If we go to the classics of political theory, 
we find a focus on the preconditions for political order and a focus on how that order 
is maintained. Present-day political scientists seem to have forgotten about precon-
ditions. With very few exceptions, they take the existence of particular institutions, 
or the need to create them, as a starting-point of analysis. To take an example, they 
study how elections are held and how they should be held, and who wins, but not 
why they are held, and how they interact with other social practices. An anthropolo-
gist would find it interesting that donors spent around $1 billion on the Congo’s first-
ever election in 2006 and would concentrate on how that event reflected and changed 
social processes. A political scientist would ask if the election adhered to established 
practices that have emerged elsewhere, which parties ran, and who won.  Anthropol-
ogists focus on the constitutive, political scientists on the outcome. Anthropologists 
tend to define politics as a question of who we are, political scientists tend to define 
it as who gets what, when, how. In the terms of classical political theory, anthropolo-
gists focus on the preconditions for political order, and political scientists on how 
that order is maintained. 
Ian Hacking 9 problematises modes of knowledge as what he calls styles of rea-
soning. Styles of reasoning are characterised by the objects that constitute the world 
 7  Max Weber, ’Science as Vocation’ in H.H.Gerth & C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociol-
ogy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946 edition), pp. 129–156.  Available at https://docs.google.com/vie
wer?a=v&q=cache:mPSTU8MQuAAJ:mail.www.anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-
Science-as-a-Vocation.pdf+max+weber+science+as+a+voccation&hl=no&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESiXuTOn6
T7f0zJ6vj5XnlATX5QXXn0v7cSOd8ST3V9nH62cNx9cmcb1B1yVM-I2mLicqXYonUUSXqXxxudvY_LR
DImL41Oy5g1n2lBEjE2FdYeZNgPrGTfCeQGl8e20vaTJtiVd&sig=AHIEtbRqm49_nsFWw4nHgCTaKTF-
pGg8scQ, accessed 20 January 2013.
 8  Iver B. Neumann, At Home with Diplomats: Inside a European Foreign Ministry (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2012).
 9 Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
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to be known, preconditions for making truth claims, and ‘criteria of proof and dem-
onstration’ 10 – that is, an ontology, an epistemology, and a methodology. The differ-
ence in object of study (constitution v outcome) reflects an ontic difference between 
seeing the social world as emergent, like most anthropologists, and seeing it as struc-
turally given or in terms of methodological individualism, like most political scien-
tists.  This ontic difference is tied in with how the two disciplines lean towards differ-
ent epistemological commitments (in Weberian terms, understanding v explanation) 
as well as towards different methodologies (some variant on the phenomenological 
themes of intent and reflexivity v defining the object as a ‘dependent variable’ to be 
studied by other stuff that is held to be invariant – independent variables). 
Political science started, back in the seventeenth century, as a state-induced sci-
ence of governing people. Small wonder that relations to the state are doxic, and 
small wonder that the discipline’s gaze is top-down. This disciplinary closeness to 
the subject matter and to the state is a problem in its own right. Not so with anthro-
pology, which was a bottom-up project, concentrating on ‘the native’s point of view’ 
(this undertaking was also financed by the state, who wanted knowledge about the 
natives which could be used, but never mind that; the point for now is how these two 
disciplines spawned different ways of producing data about the social). The differ-
ences between the two disciplines may be summed up as follows:
                               Anthropology                      Political science                
Ontology               Reality constructed             Structure or agents given       
Epistemology        Constructing  knowledge    Excavating truth               
Methodology         Reflexivity                        Identify means and intent
Matrix one: Ideal-typical styles of reasoning in anthropology and political science
I would argue that we need a lot more anthropology-style work in IR, and that we 
have a glut of political science-style work. Since the mismatch between the two is 
stunning in the US, whereas it is fairly balanced in Europe, it stands to reason that 
Europe has something to offer in this regard.
Conclusion
IR is a social science. The social consists of relations between individuals and groups. 
These relations may be studied in a number of different ways, but they cannot simply 
be assumed. That would not be a social way of studying the world, and so it would 
not count as a fully social science approach to the world at all. IR must be placed on 
a sounder footing in terms of what our objects of study should be, as well as in terms 
of how we should study those objects of study. Europe, and by ‘Europe’ I mean in 
this regard not least our institutional publication outlets – European Journal of Inter-
10 Ibid., p. 4.
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national Relations, Review of International Studies, Millennium and now European 
Review of International Studies – has two key things to offer. The first one is a cluster 
of exogenous perspectives on the state, which makes it possible to study variation 
between types of states, relations between them and change in state-society relations. 
The second is a cluster of ways to go about that task. Not a small contribution, and 
one that thousands of scholars are working full time trying to improve further.
